The Center for the Study of Federalism is a nonpartisan, interdisciplinary research and education institution dedicated to supporting and advancing scholarship and public understanding of federal theories, principles, institutions, and processes as practical means of organizing power in free societies.



array(8) { ["encoding"]=> string(0) "" ["title"]=> string(48) "Publius: The Journal of Federalism Current Issue" ["link"]=> string(31) "" ["language"]=> string(5) "en-us" ["lastBuildDate"]=> string(29) "Sat, 09 Dec 2017 06:54:31 GMT" ["items"]=> array(6) { [0]=> array(6) { ["title"]=> string(69) "Restructuring the State: Mainstream Responses to Regional Nationalism" ["link"]=> string(62) "" ["description"]=> string(1254) "<span class="paragraphSection">Under what conditions are “holding-together” federations created? And what shapes the development of their territorial structures? This article answers these questions through a comparative-historical analysis of territorial restructuring in Belgium, Spain, and the UK. It shows that “holding-together” federations are created during a critical juncture opened by a surge of regional nationalism and that the strategic responses of mainstream parties to this threat are conditioned by their ideology and their ability to “credibly” deploy accommodative strategies. These constitutional settlements put countries on a path of institutional development that is conditioned by mainstream parties’ ideational adaptation to the political foundations of the federation and by their power in the system of inter-governmental relations. Even when regionalist parties regain control of the agenda, mainstream parties’ ideological adherence to the norms enshrined in the constitutions, coupled with their resilient power in the system of inter-governmental relations, means that institutional change is gradual. These insights bear relevance for institutional theory and for comparative federalism.</span>" ["author"]=> string(10) "Toubeau S." ["guid"]=> string(37) "" ["pubDate"]=> string(29) "Thu, 26 Oct 2017 00:00:00 GMT" } [1]=> array(6) { ["title"]=> string(80) "Territorial Politics and Institutional Change: A Comparative-Historical Analysis" ["link"]=> string(61) "" ["description"]=> string(934) "<span class="paragraphSection">In the introductory article for this special issue, we argue that studying territorial politics through comparative-historical analysis (CHA) offers valuable insights in understanding the changing territorial distribution of authority in federal, regional, and decentralized countries. We point to limitations that have beset the analysis of territorial politics and suggest how recent advances in CHA offer a promising approach to avoid and overcome existing shortcomings. We also demonstrate and illustrate the ways that vertical and horizontal dimensions of territorial structures evolve over time, from the moment they are created to subsequent episodes of reform. Our aim is to show that time has causal relevance in connecting past and present patterns of change and continuity, and thus in capturing the formative and developmental pathways of changes in territorial authority.</span>" ["author"]=> string(35) "Broschek J, Petersohn B, Toubeau S." ["guid"]=> string(37) "" ["pubDate"]=> string(29) "Tue, 17 Oct 2017 00:00:00 GMT" } [2]=> array(6) { ["title"]=> string(86) "Governing Diversity in South Asia: Explaining Divergent Pathways in India and Pakistan" ["link"]=> string(63) "" ["description"]=> string(1119) "<span class="paragraphSection">This article applies a comparative-historical analysis (critical junctures and multiple-orders framework) to understand how and why India and Pakistan chose different strategies for the management of diversity after partition, despite their common colonial roots. After identifying several strategies for the management of diversity, the article traces the factors which account for a predominantly group-dominant approach to diversity in Pakistan and an integrationist approach in India. The analysis highlights the relevance of structural antecedent conditions during colonial times: namely the accommodationist tradition within Congress, and the absence thereof in Pakistan (Muslim League) and the group-dominant legacy of the military and civil service. The comparison also draws attention to gradual processes of change within a dominant path and nuances the relevance of elections as sufficient mechanisms for strengthening accommodation. For elections to fulfil this accommodationist potential, they need to be embedded within a liberal constitutional framework.</span>" ["author"]=> string(10) "Swenden W." ["guid"]=> string(37) "" ["pubDate"]=> string(29) "Wed, 11 Oct 2017 00:00:00 GMT" } [3]=> array(6) { ["title"]=> string(99) "Advancing Backwards: Why Institutional Reform of German Federalism Reinforced Joint Decision-Making" ["link"]=> string(63) "" ["description"]=> string(1175) "<span class="paragraphSection">A series of recent reforms in German federalism have created a dynamic development unprecedented in the Federal Republic. They aimed at increasing federal and Länder governments’ autonomy by decentralization and separating powers. Being negotiated in established structures of joint decision-making, significant change could hardly be expected. However, change evolved in a sequential process triggered by particular conditions: decisions of the constitutional court in the first federalism reform, the broader fiscal and economic crisis in the second, and a deadline to renovate the fiscal equalization scheme in the third. After first steps to decentralize powers, subsequent reforms reinforced cooperative federalism, but with an even stronger role of the federal government. Following a comparative-historical institutionalist perspective, the federal dynamics can be explained by the interplay of established institutions, routinized negotiation systems and different events triggering change. In contrast to the gradual evolution of cooperative federalism, these triggers caused unintended and contradictory effects.</span>" ["author"]=> string(21) "Benz A, Sonnicksen J." ["guid"]=> string(37) "" ["pubDate"]=> string(29) "Tue, 26 Sep 2017 00:00:00 GMT" } [4]=> array(6) { ["title"]=> string(136) "The State between Minority and Majority Nationalism: Decentralization, Symbolic Recognition, and Secessionist Crises in Spain and Canada" ["link"]=> string(62) "" ["description"]=> string(1156) "<span class="paragraphSection">This article addresses the debate about the relative utility of accommodative federalism as a method of conflict management in multinational states. Comparative scholarship on this issue assumes that territorial reform translates into political stability or instability through policy substance. This article tests that assumption against processes of institutional accommodation of Catalan and Quebecois demands for autonomy and recognition. The comparison demonstrates the absence of a linear relationship between institutional change and political instability. When autonomy for minority regions is extended without symbolic recognition, subsequent majority response unfolds in the policy arena, mostly through attempts to symmetrize autonomy arrangements (self-amplifying sequence). However, when the extension of territorial autonomy is combined with formal symbolic recognition, it paves the way for majority political backlash (reactive sequence). Open political opposition by a segment of majority political community, in turn, stimulates secessionist sentiment among members of minority community.</span>" ["author"]=> string(8) "Basta K." ["guid"]=> string(37) "" ["pubDate"]=> string(29) "Sat, 02 Sep 2017 00:00:00 GMT" } [5]=> array(6) { ["title"]=> string(73) "The Origins of Holding-Together Federalism: Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka" ["link"]=> string(62) "" ["description"]=> string(1089) "<span class="paragraphSection">Theories on the origin of federalism generally only apply to coming-together federalism. In Asia, some states introduced federalism following decolonization to hold together multiethnic communities, but others centralized and pursued a nation-building agenda. Federalism was not established in Asia again until Nepal’s new constitution of 2015. Why has federalism been resisted and what causes its institutionalization? Using the cases of Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, I show that a moderate secession risk, together with a substantive peripheral infrastructural capacity, are necessary conditions for the establishment of holding-together federalism. A high secession risk prevents the formation of an alliance between minority ethnic groups and regime change agents from the dominant ethnic group, which I argue is the key mechanism for federalization in these contexts. A bargain with the core results in quasi-federalism for regime maintenance. Conversely, demands for federalism are too easily repressed when secession risk is low.</span>" ["author"]=> string(9) "Breen MG." ["guid"]=> string(37) "" ["pubDate"]=> string(29) "Wed, 22 Mar 2017 00:00:00 GMT" } } ["items_count"]=> int(6) ["cached"]=> int(1) }
See the full issue >