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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Special Issue of Publius: A Call for Manuscripts ... 1
APSA Adds Section on Federalism ... 2
National Institute of Education to Publish Pamphlets on Federalism ... 2
Call for Papers on Comparative State Politics ... 3
Further Evidence on Fiscal Centralization and Decentralization by D. G. Davies ... 4
A Memo from Deil S. Wright on the Study of Federalism ... 9

A SPECIAL ISSUE OF PUBLIUS: A CALL FOR MANUSCRIPTS

The "New Federalism" Focus

Publius: The Journal of Federalism invites submission of articles for a special issue dealing with the topic of President Reagan's "New Federalism." The editors especially encourage papers which address the issues of: (1) Reagan's philosophy of federalism and the development and fate of his "New Federalism" legislative agenda; (2) impacts of the "New Federalism" program in specific policy fields (housing, transportation, employment, non-profit sector, etc.); (3) impacts of the "New Federalism" programs on urban programs and finances; (4) impact of the "New Federalism" programs on state-level administration and organization. Other papers on the general topic of "New Federalism" will be considered as well.

Prospective contributors should send each of the guest editors a letter of intent to submit an article along with a one page summary of their research indicating its focus, methodology, and anticipated findings. Letters of intent should be received as soon as possible, but no later than March of 1984. Accepted manuscripts should be completed by August, 1984. Publication is scheduled for the summer of 1985.

Guest editors are: Richard L. Cole, Institute of Urban Studies, University of Texas at Arlington, P.O. Box 19588, Arlington, Texas 76019;

A Call for Manuscripts (Con't)

Delbert A. Taebel, Institute of Urban Studies, University of Texas at Arlington, P.O. Box 19588, Arlington, Texas 76019; and David A. Caputo, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907.

APSA ADDS SECTION ON FEDERALISM

At its most recent meeting in Chicago, the American Political Science Association voted to add a section on "Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations" to its yearly convention proceedings. The panels organized under this section will be part of the APSA's formal program rather than being listed under unaffiliated groups. This represents a major step forward for those of us interested in making the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations more central to the discipline. Anyone interested in organizing a panel for next year's APSA convention, or any ideas for papers, should be sent to Stephen Schechter at Russell Sage College, Department of Government, Troy, New York 12180.

The Section will initially be composed of the hundred or so people who signed the petition to the APSA requesting official recognition. An interim committee is running the Section until formal elections can be held at next year's APSA convention. Anyone interested in joining the Section should write a note to Stephen Schechter to have their names added to the list.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION TO PUBLISH
PAMPHLETS ON FEDERALISM

NIE will soon publish a series of pamphlets designed to enhance the teaching of federalism in our nation's secondary schools. The pamphlets are aimed at those who teach courses on American government, American history, social studies, and civics. The title of the overall project is "Utilizing Federalist Principles in Civic Education." The following pamphlets are projected:

"Federalism, Republicanism, and Civic Virtue" - Daniel J. Elazar

"Virtue and the Federal Republic" - Donald S. Lutz

"Federalism and the Constitution" - Samuel Krislov

"Federalism and a Pluralistic Society" - John Kincaid

"Political Parties and Citizen Participation in the Federal System" -
John F. Bibby

Pamphlets on Federalism (Con't)

"State Capacities for Governance in the Federal System" - Stephen Schechter

"The Local Community in the Federal System" - Robert Salisbury

"Education in a Federal Democracy" - Frederick Wirt

"Federalism in American History and Civics Texts" - Ellis Katz

Each pamphlet introduces and discusses some aspect of federalism and its implication for American politics and provides teachers not only with a deeper understanding of the subject, but also introduces them to the broader literature on the topic and suggests ways in which the material can be organized for presentation in class. Copies may be obtained from the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University.

CALL FOR PAPERS ON COMPARATIVE STATE POLITICS

The Comparative State Politics Group will sponsor a number of panels and roundtables at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Proposals for sessions and/or papers should be sent to:

Professor Ellis Katz
Center for the Study of Federalism
025-25
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA 19122

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON FISCAL CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

D. G. Davies

Introduction

Powerful economic and social forces have been at work in developed countries over the past 35 years. The purpose of this note is to show the impact of these forces on fiscal centralization and decentralization in those economically advanced countries that have federally structured governments.

There are many complex reasons for believing that there has been an increasing centralization of government finances in federal countries. These factors range all the way from the effect of Keynesian policy prescriptions to continued international tensions.¹ Somewhat surprisingly, however, the evidence of the post-World War era does not support the idea of increased fiscal centralization.

The Evidence

The figures in Table I show for the respective countries the proportion of total taxes collected that is levied by the central government. The long run trend of the figures is falling for all countries with Canada exhibiting the steepest decline.² Additional analysis of each country indicates that the elasticity of central taxes with respect to GNP is less than the elasticity of total taxes to GNP. This result lends further weight to the thesis that federal tax collections have grown less rapidly than total tax revenue despite the fact that central government revenues have increased appreciably and manifested sensitivity to changes in GNP during the post-war period.

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor R. L. Mathews, Director of the Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations at the Australian National University for his kind permission to use part of the research completed at the Centre.

¹ For a discussion of the factors behind increases in federal and provincial-state-local fiscal variables see David G. Davies, "An Analysis of Fiscal Centralisation, Decentralisation, and the Pattern of Federal and State-Local Taxes," in R. L. Mathews (ed.) State and Local Taxation, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, pp. 65-82.

² See Douglas A. L. Auld, Contemporary and Historical Economic Dimensions of Canadian Confederation, Discussion Paper No. 79-1, Department of Economics, University of Guelph for an excellent history and analysis of fiscal developments in Canada from just before confederation until the present.

Table I

RATIO OF CENTRAL TO TOTAL GOVERNMENTAL TAXES						
Year	Australia ^a	United States ^b	United States ^c	Canada ^c	W. Germany ^b	Switzerland ^h
1947		.760	.768	.764		
1948		.731	.742	.718		
1949	.882	.684	.703	.691		
1950	.874	.723	.735	.690		
1951	.981	.757	.765	.725	.590	
1952	.895	.753	.758	.741	.601	
1953	.875	.745	.752	.737	.585	.488
1954	.865	.712	.723	.714	.597	
1955	.858	.719	.730	.709	.598	.492
1956	.855	.711	.724	.709	.582	.525
1957	.849	.703	.719	.676	.561	.464
1958	.843	.681	.699	.644	.557	.516
1959	.828	.652	.705	.651	.547	.476
1960	.826	.675	.700	.648	.530	.497
1961	.836	.663	.680	.636	.525	.473
1962	.824	.662	.691	.593	.529	.495
1963	.814	.661	.642	.583	.537	.470
1964	.815	.640	.672	.590	.539	.499
1965	.825	.640	.673	.573	.548	.469
1966	.827	.601	.652	.581	.558	.486
1967	.820	.629	.675	.567	.556	.452
1968	.821	.639	.679	.561	.549	.464
1969	.820	.638	.680	.569	.545	.447
1970	.826	.602	.651	.559	.552	.454
1971	.835	.577	.634	.560	.551	.438
1972	.810	.580	.637	.559	.512	.448
1973	.787	.580	.647	.561	.522	.408
1974	.797	.609	.609	.588	.511	.405
1975	.801	.583	.651	.576	.523	.378
1976	.744	.594	.659	.574	.518	.409
1977	.798	.586	.639	.512	.514	.401
1978	.797	.586	.648	.491	.517	.416
1979	.799	.602	.665	.500		
1980	.806	.606	.667	.509		
1981 ^d		.618	.643	.537		

^aAustralia has no separate social security tax.

^bExcludes social security contributions.

^cIncludes social security contributions.

^dThrough the third quarter of the year.

Sources: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts, National Income and Expenditure, various years; U.S. Department of Commerce, The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-65, and Survey of Current Business, various years; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada, National Accounts, Income and Expenditure 1926-56, National Accounts and Expenditures by Quarter, 1947-61, and National Accounts and Expenditures, various quarters; United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, 1972, 1979; OECD, Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1971, and OECD, National Account Statistics, various years.

As in the case of centralization there are many reasons for the financial growth of provincial-state-local governments. They range from the fact that the traditional governmental functions performed by non-federal governments are more income elastic than those undertaken by the federal government to the belief that minority groups receive more effective representation in smaller units of government.

Table II is the complement of Table I and shows that the ratios of provincial-state-local taxes to total taxes have been generally increasing between the years 1947 and 1981. These statistics support the idea that the forces behind growing fiscal decentralization have been more powerful than those working toward fiscal centralization. All federal countries investigated reveal a pattern of increasing fiscal importance in provincial-state-local governments.

Decentralization and Separation

The reader should exercise caution in extrapolating the trends reported in this note. The process of decentralization may have within it the seeds and forces necessary to generate change. While in many cases provincial, state, and local authorities can better cater to the preferences of individual voters who are members of various cultural, ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious, or social groups, the effects of decentralized public policy may generate increasing disparities among various governmental units and their citizens. As time passes these differences in the way individuals are treated in sub-national governments may stimulate reaction and a movement for central authority intervention to restore more equality and balance, and to set minimum standards by which all provincial, state, and local jurisdictions must abide. Some decentralization may be traded off for other goals.

There is therefore the possibility of a cycling of centralization and decentralization process. As GNP grows over the long run and time passes, the amount of government taxes, revenues and expenditures grows, but at times regional economic and social factors cause the provincial-state-local share to grow relative to the federal share while at other times the reverse occurs.

There is no compelling reason to assume, however, that this pattern of fiscal cycling between central and regional governments will continue indefinitely. If the strong desire of regional governments to meet citizen needs and demands for various provincial-state-local governmental services is frequently thwarted, separation from the federation becomes a genuine and attractive alternative. The fact that the data in this paper indicate increasing fiscal decentralization in economically developed federal countries is not prima facie

TABLE II

RATIO OF PROVINCIAL-STATE-LOCAL-TAXES TO TOTAL GOVERNMENTAL TAXES

Year	Australia ^a	United States ^b	United States ^c	Canada ^c	W. Germany ^b	Switzerland ^b
1947		.240	.232	.236		
1948		.269	.258	.282		
1949	.118	.316	.297	.309		
1950	.126	.277	.265	.310		
1951	.109	.243	.235	.274	.410	
1952	.120	.247	.242	.259	.399	
1953	.125	.255	.248	.263	.405	.512
1954	.135	.288	.277	.286	.403	
1955	.142	.281	.270	.291	.402	.508
1956	.145	.289	.276	.291	.418	.476
1957	.151	.297	.281	.324	.439	.536
1958	.157	.319	.301	.356	.443	.484
1959	.182	.348	.295	.349	.453	.524
1960	.174	.325	.300	.352	.470	.503
1961	.164	.337	.310	.364	.475	.527
1962	.176	.338	.309	.407	.471	.505
1963	.186	.339	.308	.417	.463	.530
1964	.185	.360	.328	.410	.561	.501
1965	.175	.360	.327	.422	.452	.531
1966	.173	.399	.318	.419	.442	.514
1967	.180	.371	.325	.433	.444	.548
1968	.179	.361	.321	.439	.451	.536
1969	.180	.362	.320	.431	.455	.553
1970	.174	.398	.349	.441	.448	.546
1971	.165	.423	.366	.440	.449	.562
1972	.190	.420	.363	.441	.488	.552
1973	.213	.420	.353	.439	.478	.592
1974	.203	.391	.391	.412	.489	.595
1975	.199	.417	.349	.424	.477	.622
1976	.206	.406	.341	.426	.482	.591
1977	.202	.414	.361	.488	.486	.599
1978	.203	.414	.352	.509	.483	.584
1979	.201	.398	.335	.500		
1980	.194	.394	.333	.491		
1981 ^d		.382	.357	.463		

^aAustralia has no separate social security tax.

^bExcludes social security contributions.

^cIncludes social security contributions.

^dThrough the third quarter of the year.

Same as Table I.

evidence that central governments have been particularly sympathetic and responsive to regional needs or able to satisfy changing aspirations. It may well be that the decentralizing trend of the past 35 years has been neither strong enough nor sufficiently rapid to prevent serious moves toward the separation of noncentral governments.

A MEMO FROM DEIL S. WRIGHT ON THE STUDY OF FEDERALISM

To: Students/Scholars of Federalism/IGR and Public Opinion/Political Participation

From: Deil S. Wright, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)

Query: How much do we know and how can we integrate knowledge about public opinion and political participation with Federalism/IGR theories?

For some time I have been interested in and intrigued by the extensive amount of public opinion and participation data and research findings available in the scholarly literature. The research covers opinions and participation at the local, the state, or the national levels. Seldom, however, do studies or surveys simultaneously examine opinions (attitudes) and participation (actions/activities) at the local and state and national planes of governance. Stated differently, there is a dearth of research and theorizing on citizen attitudes/actions that use concepts and frameworks employed by researchers/writers on federalism and IGR. Four articles have provided some entre' into the subject. They are:

- (1) M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (August 1967): 291-317.
- (2) M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Ziegler, "The Saliency of American State Politics," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970): 523-525.
- (3) Harlan Hahn, "Attitudes Toward Federalism and the 'Local-Cosmopolitan' Dimension," Publius, 4 (Summer 1974): 65-74.
- (4) Mavis Mann Reeves and Parris N. Glendenning, "Areal Federalism and Public Opinion," Publius, 6 (Spring 1976): 135-167.

Other articles could be mentioned, but the aim of this short note is not bibliographic. Instead, it takes a preliminary and provisional stab at identifying seven dimensions of citizen attitudes and actions on (or around) which it might prove useful to order or organize public opinion and political participation data and analyses. These seven dimensions are offered for whatever response(s), criticism(s), and revision(s) may be forthcoming in CFS Notes or elsewhere.

One further background or contextual point needs to be made. When I refer to opinion/participation data used in a Federalism/IGR framework, I mean data that derive from questions that asked for attitudes/actions of the citizens on the national and state and local planes within the U.S. multijurisdictional system. The Jennings, Jennings/Zigler, Hahn, and Mann/Glendenning articles are exemplary of the Federalism/IGR focus to which I am calling attention (or inattention). With these exceptions, and a few others, the actions and attitudes of the citizenry (or masspublics) have not been systematically integrated into the theoretical foundations of federalism and IGR. One approach would be to posit those attitude and action configurations among the citizenry that promote and support a federal distribution of powers (as well as the underlying covenant on diversity).

Memo on the Study of Federalism (Con't)

Before speculating about action/attitude prerequisites, however, a prior step is necessary. That initial step is the attempt to specify components or dimensions of citizen attitudes and actions that have an influence on federalism and IGR. The following is a "short list" of possible dimensions.

1. Information/knowledge. This dimension focuses on the awareness, attentiveness, salience, and general level of knowledge that citizens have about the main jurisdictional (governmental) planes operative in a system.
2. Interactions/involvement. Here the focus is on access, contacts, and varied forms of participation by citizens in the processes of the different jurisdictions.
3. Impact/intervention. What is the perceived impact on citizens of the different planes of government; how important or significant are the results or effects of policies on citizens?
4. Issues/policies. What problems or issues are viewed by the public as falling within the purview or domain of different jurisdictions? What issues and policies should be implemented by which governments? Which government(s) handles which programs, functions, activities best?
5. Influence/efficacy. On or "over" which jurisdictions does the citizenry feel he/she has the most influence? What are the perceived levels of citizen influence within the various planes?
6. Evaluation/assessment. What type of judgments are levied by the citizen on the performance of the various officials, policies, and governments? How are the taxing and spending policies of the different planes of government assessed?
7. Legitimacy/authority. What are the levels of trust, confidence, and respect accorded to the governing authorities (officials and institutions) within and among the several jurisdictional planes? What are the levels of acceptance and compliance with the laws, policies, and programs for each plane of government?

These seven dimensions constitute one way, perhaps not the best way, of exploring the citizen attitude/action base of federal and intergovernmental theories. Perhaps this crude initial effort will prompt someone to develop a better one. What scholars are doing work on this or closely related topic(s)? Who might be encouraged to explore the topic more carefully and systematically?

Notebook

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